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Rediscovering the Constitution*
JACK LEE TSEN-TA
“To say that freedom is Western or un-Asian is to offend our own tradi-
tions. It is true that Asians lay great emphasis on order and societal
stability. But it is certainly wrong to regard society as a kind of false god
upon whose altar the individual must melt into the faceless community.”
– Datuk Anwar Ibrahim,
Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia1
The fundamental liberties in our Constitution involve a study
of tensions: between an individual’s rights and the community’s
interests, between the role of the judiciary on the one hand and
the executive and legislature on the other. How we should inter-
pret them depends on where we think equilibrium should be
established.
This depends on two main factors. The first is the proper func-
tion of the judiciary as laid down by our Constitution, which is
discussed in Part I of this article. The second is the nature of our
fundamental liberties, for they are worded with varying degrees
Jack Lee Tsen-Ta, a fourth year student, Faculty of Law, National University of
Singapore, Academic Year 1994-95, is a second prize winner of the Singapore
Law Review Essay Competititon 1994-95.
*
1
I thank Ms Thio Li-ann and Chan Jen Yee for their thoughtful comments
on this article.
“Be Prepared to Champion Universal Ideals, Says Anwar” The Straits Times,
3 December 1994 at 15.
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of generality. Broadly speaking, Arts 10 (prohibition of slavery
and forced labour), 11 (protection against retrospective criminal
laws and repeated trials), 13 (prohibition of banishment and
freedom of movement) and 16 (rights in respect of education) are
mostly free from doubt. Articles 14 (freedom of speech, assembly
and association) and 15 (freedom of religion) bear an intermediate
level of generality. Still relatively intelligible, they involve concepts
such as “speech and expression” and “religion” which are more
difficult to interpret. But Arts 9 and 12 possess a high degree
of generality as they embody the broad concepts of “personal
liberty”, “equality” and “equal protection”. Taking these factors
into account, Part II looks at two general approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation and explains why one of them – moderate
textualism – should be adopted by the courts. Finally, Part III
illustrates moderate textualism in action by proposing a reinter-
pretation of Art 9(1) of the Constitution.
This is the thrust of the article: our judges, charged by the
supreme law of the land with responsibility to interpret our funda-
mental liberties freely where such freedom is due, must rediscover
their proper constitutional role.
I. THE COURT‘S ROLE: REVIEWING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION2
We begin with an analysis of the judiciary’s role as revealed through
the text of the Constitution.3 Although the Constitution is silent
on the point, it is taken for granted today that courts possess a
“judicial review jurisdiction” – a power to declare Parliamentary
2
3
See A Wilson, “The Doctrine and Practice of Judicial Review of Legislation”
(1962) 4 Me Judice 20; Kevin Tan Yew Lee, Yeo Tiong Min & Lee Kiat Seng,
Constitutional Law in Malaysia and Singapore (1991) at 72-78, 276-80.
1992 Ed.
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legislation void if it contravenes the Constitution. It was not
always so.
It is unclear where the idea that government is subject to a fun-
damental or higher law springs from.4 American constitutional
law has long viewed the common law as the source. Often cited
as authority are the words of Coke CJ in the 17th-century English
decision Dr Bonham’s Case: “[W]hen an Act of Parliament is
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible
to be performed, the Common Law will controul it and adjudge
such Act to be void.”5 Unfortunately, the situation is more hazy:
It is questionable whether Coke was actually appealing to the
existence of a fundamental law,6 and even if the doctrine had
existed in England in the first place it was soon whittled down
by judges in favour of Parliamentary supremacy.7
Yet in the 1780s American courts began exercising judicial review
by striking down legislation with reference to higher unwritten,
common law concepts, sometimes termed “natural justice”. This
was extremely controversial. The practice was opposed by some
lawyers and judges. There were mass public protests and popular
petitions to state legislatures against it. Some legislatures voted
to censure the courts, and even tried to remove from office judges
perceived to be exercising it. Yet judicial review rapidly gained
acceptance in the 1790s after prominent framers of the Constitu-
tion like James Iredell, Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson
came forward to justify the practice.8 They did so not on the
4
5
6
7
8
See Thorne, “Dr Bonham’s Case” (1938) 54 LQR 543 at 543.
(1610) 8 Co Rep 113b at 118a, 77 ER 646 at 652 (Ct of Common Pleas).
See Thorne, supra, n 4, who argues that Coke CJ’s words dealt only with
statutory interpretation. He concludes at 552, “Coke’s ambitious political
theory is found to be not his, but the work of a later generation of judges,
commentators, and lawyers.”
Wilson, supra, n 2 at 30-34.
Leslie Friedman Goldstein, In Defense of the Text: Democracy and Constitu-
tional Theory (1991) at 18-23, 76-84.
160 Singapore Law Review (1995)
basis of unwritten law but on the written Constitution. For in-
stance, in Calder v Bull,9 Iredell J was of the view that:
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard;
the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject;
and all that the court could properly say, in such an event,
would be, that the legislature, possessed of an equal right of
opinion, had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges,
was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.
[By contrast,] If any act of Congress or of the legislature of
a state, violates [the] constitutional provisions, it is unques-
tionably void [because the people,] when they framed the federal
Constitution, . . . define[d] with precision the objects of the
legislative power, and . . . restrain[ed] its exercise within marked
and settled boundaries.
Judicial review, grounded firmly in the Constitution, had gained
a stable and coherent foundation. This justification was given
eloquent expression in the Supreme Court decision of Marbury
v Madison.10 According to John Marshall CJ, the basic nature of
a constitution as fundamental law stems from the original right
of a nation’s people to establish principles of government that
most contribute to their own happiness: “The exercise of this
original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to
be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are
deemed fundamental.” The principles of government set down in
the United States Constitution embody the well-known doctrine of
the separation of powers advocated by 18th-century French jurist
9
10
(1798) 3 US (3 Dallas) 356 at 399 (obiter dicta). This quotation rearranges
the original order of Iredell J’s sentences. The bracketed phrases indicate
the breaks between passages that have been reordered.
(1803) 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 at 176-80, 2 L Ed 60 at 73-74. See also Calder
v Bull, ibid; Fletcher v Peck (1810) 10 US (6 Cranch) 87 (in these two
cases the court relied on both unwritten law and the constitutional text);
New Jersey v Wilson (1812) 11 US (7 Cranch) 164; Dartmouth College v
Woodward (1819) 17 US (4 Wheat) 518.
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and political philosopher, Baron de la Montesquieu. Montesquieu
championed the separation and balancing of the powers possessed
by the three branches of government – executive, legislature and
judiciary – to combat tyranny and as a guarantee for freedom
of the individual:
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legis-
lative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to
arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator.
Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with violence and oppression.11
If the purpose of instituting a constitution is to define the limits
on the powers of government, it logically follows that a constitu-
tion must be fundamental law, unchangeable by ordinary legislative
means. If it were not so, then written constitutions are merely
“absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its
own nature illimitable.”12 The fact that a constitution is written
down reinforces its fundamental nature by ensuring that limitations
on governmental power cannot be mistaken or forgotten.
The power of judicial review lies not with the executive or
legislature but the judiciary. This is because the Constitution is
a kind of law – a law on a higher level than ordinary legislation,
but still law – and “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is. . . . So if a
law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case... the court must deter-
mine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is the
very essence of judicial duty.”13 The judiciary derives power to
11
12
Montesquieu, Les Spirits de Lois (1748); The Spirit of the Laws (Thomas
Nugent translator, 1949) book XI ch 6 at 151. However this doctrine has
existed since the time of the ancient Greeks: Tan, Yeo & Lee, supra, n 2
at 15-16.
Marbury v Madison, supra, n 10.
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interpret the law from the people, since it is established under the
Constitution which represents the will of the people.
There is another reason why the judiciary alone is considered
the correct branch of government to interpret the Constitution:
in theory, it is the branch of government most free from political
bias.14 Both the legislature and executive are largely politically
motivated. They owe an obligation to pursue policies which pro-
mote the interests of those who elect them into office. Therefore
they should not be entrusted with power to interpret the Constitu-
tion since it is possible that they might bend the Constitution to
accommodate these policies.15
Thus it is rightly the role of the courts to test executive and
legislative acts against the Constitution. In the case of a conflict
the Constitution must prevail, for it is a higher, more fundamental
law. In the words of Marbury v Madison: “Certainly all those
who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as form-
ing the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and,
consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that
an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.”
Our courts possess judicial review jurisdiction because the Singa-
pore Constitution is founded on the same premise as the United
States Constitution, ie the separation of powers doctrine.16 Our
13
14
15
16
Ibid. See also PP v Oh Keng Seng [1976] 2 MLJ 125 at 127 (HC, Seremban)
and Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR 662 at 681 (HC, Singapore):
“[T]he court has the power and duty to ensure that the provisions of the
Constitution are observed. The court also has a duty to declare invalid any
exercise of power, legislative and executive, which exceeds the limits of the
power conferred by the Constitution, or which contravenes any prohibition
which the Constitution provides.”
Theory and reality frequently diverge. On safeguards against judicial activ-
ism, see infra, n 122-24, and the accompanying text.
MP Jain, “Constitutional Remedies” in The Constitution of Malaysia:
Further Perspectives and Developments (FA Trindade & HP Lee eds, 1986)
151 at 159.
Cheong Seok Leng v PP [1988] 2 MLJ 481 at 487 col 2F (HC) per Chan
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Constitution, like the constitutions of other former British colonies,
is based on the “Westminster model”,17 capturing the spirit if not
the exact form of British institutions.18 As the Privy Council on
appeal from Jamaica explained in Hinds v The Queen:19
17
18
19
Sek Keong JC, as he then was: “[T]he Constitution of the Republic of
Singapore is. . . based on the doctrine of separation of powers (as modified
to accommodate the Westminster model of Parliamentary government). . .”
Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981] 1 MLJ 64 at 68 (PC on appeal from Singapore);
JB Jeyaratnam v Attorney-General of Singapore [1988] 3 MLJ 465 at
466-67 (HC): “. . . [O]ur Constitution is based essentially on the Westminster
model and adopts and codifies most, if not all, of the laws, customs,
conventions and practices of the British constitutional and parliamentary
system.”
Unlike the United Kingdom, Parliamentary supremacy theoretically does not
exist in Singapore and Malaysia: see Ah Thian v Government of Malaysia
[1976] 2 MLJ 112 at 113A (FC, Malaysia): “The doctrine of the supremacy of
Parliament does not apply in Malaysia. Here we have a written Constitution.
The power of Parliament and of state legislatures in Malaysia is limited by
the Constitution; and they cannot make any law they please.” Note, however,
the comments of NMP and Vice-Dean of Law Faculty, NUS, Associate
Professor Walter Woon in an interview with The Straits Times, 6 July 1991
at 28: “We effectively don’t have a Constitution. We have a law that can
be easily changed by Parliament, and by the party in power because the
party is Parliament. The changes themselves might not be controversial,
but it is unsettling how flexible the Constitution is, unlike, say, the United
States.” In reply, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong pointed out that past
changes to the Constitution were made only with a two-thirds parliamentary
majority and not done light-heartedly, as the intensive discussions and the
two-year gestation period of the Elected President Bill proved. He affirmed
that the Constitution had to evolve to reflect the changing needs of the
people, and that it could not be assumed that the Constitution, drafted in
1965, would be the best Constitution for always and should be frozen
in time. “So to say that because the Government in power changes the
Constitution there is no Constitution is ridiculous, to put it mildly.”: The
Straits Times, 8 July 1991 at 22.
[1977] AC 195 at 211-12 (PC on appeal from Jamaica) per Lord Diplock
(emphasis added).
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[Westminster constitutions] embody what is in substance an
agreement reached between representatives of the various shades
of political opinion in the state as to the structure of the organs
of government through which the plenitude of the sovereign
power of the state is to be exercised in the future. All of them
were negotiated as well as drafted by persons nurtured in the
tradition of that branch of the common law of England that
is concerned with public law and familiar in particular with the
basic concept of separation of legislative, executive and judicial
power as it had been developed in the unwritten constitution
of the United Kingdom.
It should be noted that the separation of powers doctrine is mod-
ified in Westminster constitutions. Unlike the “true” division
of power between the three branches of government in United
States-based systems, Parliamentary systems under Westminster
constitutions fuse the executive and legislative branches and bal-
ance their joint power against that of the judiciary. Singapore’s
constitutional system falls somewhere in between as we now have
an Elected President whose executive veto serves as a partial check
on the legislature in certain key areas such as the use of financial
reserves and the appointment of public officers.
The court’s power to pronounce on the constitutionality of
executive and legislative acts may not be express in our Consti-
tution, but from the reasoning of Marbury v Madison such a
power is clearly possessed. This is buttressed by several Articles
of the Constitution.
The Constitution’s nature as fundamental law is placed beyond
doubt by Arts 4 and 162. Article 4 states that the Constitution
is the supreme law of the Republic of Singapore and that any
law enacted by the legislature after the commencement of the
Constitution which is inconsistent with it is void to the extent of
the inconsistency.20 Article 162 has much the same effect but
20 “[I]t cannot be disputed that this ‘supremacy clause’ owes its origins to
the constitutional doctrine of supremacy of the constitution and judicial
review established by the United States Supreme Court in the classic case
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applies to laws which pre-date the Constitution. It declares that
all existing laws continue in force after the commencement of
the Constitution but shall be construed with such modifications,
adaptations, qualifications and exceptions necessary for them
to conform with the Constitution. Two other Articles, dealing
with constitutional amendments, also show that the Constitution
is not on par with ordinary legislation. Article 5(2) provides
that the Constitution may only be amended by a bill passed by a
special majority (ie supported on its Second and Third Readings
by not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of
Parliament). There is also a new Art 5(2A), not yet in force,21
which entrenches certain Articles of the Constitution including
the fundamental liberties in Part IV by providing that they cannot
be amended unless supported by at least a two-thirds majority
at a national referendum. However, the President acting in his
personal discretion may override this procedure by writing to the
Speaker of Parliament.
Finally, it is also evident from the Constitution that it is the
courts which should exercise judicial review, since Art 93 estab-
lishes that judicial power of Singapore is vested in the Supreme
21
of Marbury v Madison.”: S Jayakumar, “The Singapore Constitution and
the United States Constitution” in Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views
of the American Influence (Lawrence Ward Beer ed, 1978) 181 at 184.
Article 5(2A) was inserted into the Constitution by s 3 of the Constitution
of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 1991 (No 5 of 1991), but
has not been brought into force yet as the government is still fine-tuning
provisions of the Constitution dealing with the Elected President. At the
Third Reading of the Bill leading to Act No 5 of 1991, Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong suggested a four-year period for adjustments, modifications
and refinements: Singapore Parliamentary Debates Official Report, vol 56,
3 January 1991, at col 722, quoted in Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995
[1995] 2 SLR 201 at 204F-G. The government recently announced that it
will be several years more before Act 5(2A) is brought into operation because
legislation on the Elected President has turned out to be “more complex than
expected”: “Long Way to Go Before EP Legislation is Final”, The Straits
Times, 8 July 1995 at 1.
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Court and such subordinate courts provided by written law for
the time being in force. In recognising this, we ought not overlook
the President’s role in protecting fundamental liberties. Under
Arts 21(2)(h) and 22I of the Constitution, he may act in his
discretion to cancel, vary, confirm or refuse to confirm a re-
straining order under the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act
(Cap 167A, 1991 Ed) where the advice of Cabinet is contrary to
the recommendation of the Presidential Council for Religious
Harmony. He may also withhold concurrence under Art 151(4)
to the detention without trial of any person.22 But it is submitted
that the judiciary is still the primary guardian of our fundamental
liberties.
II. APPROACHES TO INTERPRETING
THE FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES
The above discussion shows the judiciary plays a vital role in
ensuring a proper balance between executive and legislative policy,
and the rights of individuals in Singapore.23 How, then, should
22
23
The President exercises a personal discretion in these areas, as Art 21(1)
specifies that he need only exercise his functions in accordance with the
advice of the Cabinet or a Minister authorised by Cabinet if the Constitution
does not otherwise provide.
Since the Constitution envisages the judiciary as a check on the power of
the legislature and executive, the courts have no jurisdiction to protect a
person’s fundamental liberties from being breached by another private
individual or non-governmental body. See PD Shamdasani v Central Bank
of India [1952] AIR SC 59 at 60: “There is no express reference to the State
in article 21 [Singapore’s Art 9(1)]. But could it be suggested on that account
that that article was intended to afford protection to life and personal
liberty against violation by private individuals? The words ‘except by pro-
cedure established by law’ plainly exclude such a suggestion.” This was
applied in Vidya Verma v Shiv Narain Verma [1956] AIR SC 108 at 109-10
paras 6-7, where it was held that as a rule constitutional safeguards are
directed against the State and its organs, and that protection against violation
of rights by individuals must be sought in the ordinary law. Perhaps the
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judges go about interpreting the Constitution, especially the funda-
mental liberties in Part IV which are the focus of this article?
We will examine two major schools of thought.24 Using head-
ings suggested by Leslie Goldstein,25 they are intentionalism and
textualism.
A. Intentionalism
Intentionalism requires a judge to determine how the original
framers (or drafters) and adopters of the Constitution would have
applied a provision to a given situation, and to apply it in the
same way.26 The actual wording of the Constitution is considered
time is right for a “Fundamental Liberties Act” providing for the enforcement
of civil rights against private persons.
Other schools of thought include extratextualism (non-interpretivism) and
indeterminacy. See, generally, Goldstein, supra, n 8. Extratextualism is
constitutional interpretation based not only on the constitutional text and
implications from the text but other kinds of higher law such as natural
law, national ideals, national legal custom, and what judges perceive as
“fundamental rights” possessed by individuals: see eg Ronald Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously (1977); Kenneth Karst, “Foreword: Equal Citizenship”
(1977) 91 Harv L Rev 1; John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory
of Judicial Review (1980); and Michael Perry, The Constitution, the Courts
and Human Rights (1982) and Morality, Politics and Law: A Bicentennial
Essay (1988).
Indeterminists feel that the Constitution is so malleable that it can be
interpreted to say anything, and therefore find it impossible for the law,
especially constitutional law, to constrain the discretion of judges. A par-
ticularly influential group of indeterminists forms what is known as the
Critical Legal Studies movement. Some indeterminists suggest turning away
from law and politics to other areas of knowledge such as literary criticism
and aesthetic philosophy for guidance on constitutional interpretation: see
Sanford Levinson, “Law as Literature” (1982) 60 Texas LR 373; Leif Carter,
Contemporary Constitutional Lawmaking: The Supreme Court and the Art
of Politics (1985).
Supra, n 8 at 2-3.
Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding” (1980)
24
25
26
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inconclusive and nothing more than a useful guide to these in-
tentions. This theory as currently vaunted by its proponents27
suffers from great weaknesses.
1. Practical Difficulties
The first difficulty is practical: how do we determine what the
framers and adopters actually thought? This rests on whether
historical records are available and how dependable they are.
We will examine the historical evidence relating to the framing
and adoption of the United States and Indian Constitutions, and
compare it to available evidence pertaining to the Malaysian and
Singapore Constitutions.
(1) United States Constitution: The United States Constitution
was drawn up by a Federal Constitutional Convention held in
Philadelphia from May to September 1787. It was presided over
by George Washington, and James Madison was the chief drafter.
Despite opposition, sufficient states ratified it by the summer of
1788, and the Constitution was put into effect in June 1789 when
elections named Washington as President.
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 were
held in private, and reports were not published till several years
later. Although the extensive notes made by James Madison at
the Convention and also at state ratification conventions held
between 1787 and 1788 have been established as essentially reliable
in the sense that he did not rewrite them later to suit his own
views,28 the reports are at best only a partial record. Madison
27
28
60 Boston ULR 204 at 222, reprinted in Interpreting the Constitution:
The Debate Over Original Intent (Jack N Rakove ed, 1990) at 227.
Eg Edwin Meese III, “Interpreting the Constitution” reprinted in Rakove,
supra, n 26 at 13; Raoul Berger, “New Theories of ‘Interpretation’: The
Activist Flight from the Constitution” (1986) 47 Ohio St LJ 1.
James H Hutson, “The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
16 Sing LR Rediscovering the Constitution 169
did not attempt to make verbatim notes of speeches by delegates.
If written notes of a speech were available he obtained them from
the speaker. There is no telling whether the speakers edited their
notes before passing them to him. Other notes made by Madison
were merely summaries of many hours of debate.29 Therefore, we
cannot be sure if the large volume of documentary material on
the founding of the Constitution is a historical record accurate
enough to aid in interpretation.
Subsequently, Art 1 s 5 para 3 of the Constitution mandated
the keeping and regular publication of a journal of legislative pro-
ceedings, which appeared as the Annals of Congress (1789-1824),
Congressional Debates (1824-37), Congressional Globe (1833-73)
and Congressional Record (1874 to present). Hence there are
reliable records covering the debates leading up to the 1st to 10th
Amendments added in 1791, and the other twelve between 1798
and 1951.
(2) Indian Constitution:30 After India’s independence from Brit-
ish rule, its Constitution was drafted by a Constitutent Assembly
specially formed for this purpose. To aid it in its monumental
task, the Assembly appointed 21 different committees dealing with
specific areas of the proposed Constitution. Its Constitutional
Adviser then prepared a draft constitution based on committee
reports and foreign constitutions. On 29 August 1947 a Drafting
Committee was appointed by the Assembly. Its duty was to scru-
tinize the draft Constitution prepared by the Constitutional Adviser
and revise it if necessary, then to submit it to the Assembly for
29
30
Documentary Record” (1986) 65 Texas LR 1, reprinted in Rakove, supra,
n 26 at 151.
Hutson, ibid, and Judith A Baer, “The Fruitless Search for Original Intent”
in Judging the Constitution: Critical Essays on Judicial Lawmaking (Michael
W McCann & Gerald L Houseman eds, 1989) 49 at 52-53.
M Rama Jois, Legal and Constitutional History of India (1984) vol 2, at
330-33, 344-46.
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consideration. The Drafting Committee began its work on 27 Octo-
ber 1947, giving wide publicity to proposals contained in the draft
Constitution by sending copies to all members of the Assembly,
ministries of the Indian government, provincial governments and
legislatures, and judges of the Federal Court and High Courts.
The revised draft Constitution was considered clause by clause
by the Constituent Assembly from 15 November 1948 to 17 Octo-
ber 1949, then submitted to the President of the Assembly on
3 November 1949. On 17 November 1949 the Drafting Committee
chairman moved a resolution in the Assembly that the draft
Constitution be passed. It was adopted by the Assembly on
26 November 1949, and came into force on 26 January 1950.
The Constituent Assembly became a provisional Parliament by
virtue of the transitional provision Art 379 until general elections
in 1952.
Unlike the United States Constitutional Convention of 1787,
deliberations of the Indian Constituent Assembly were held in
public and reported in great detail.31 There is thus no lack of his-
torical material relating to the framing of the Indian Constitution.
(3) Malaysian and Singapore Constitutions:32 The Singapore
Constitution, including the fundamental liberties, is derived from
31
32
Constituent Assembly Debates: Official Report (1946-50), 12 vols; B Shiva
Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution: Select Documents (1967), 4 vols.
See Harry E Groves, “Fundamental Liberties in the Constitution of the
Federation of Malaya – A Comparative Study” (1959) 5 Howard LJ 190
at 196-200; Kevin Tan Yew Lee, “A Short Legal and Constitutional History
of Singapore” in The Singapore Legal System (Walter Woon ed, 1989) at 3;
Kevin Tan Yew Lee, “The Evolution of Singapore’s Modern Constitution: De-
velopments from 1945 to the Present Day” (1989) 1 S Ac LJ 1; RH Hickling,
“The Historical Background to the Malaysian Constitution” in Essays in
Malaysian Law (1991) 76 at 90-92; RH Hickling, “The Origins of Con-
stitutional Government in Singapore” in Essays in Singapore Law (1992) 1
at 29-32.
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the Malaysian Federal Constitution. In January 1956, a confer-
ence was held in London to discuss how independence of Malaya
from the United Kingdom should be achieved. It was agreed
between Crown representatives and the Alliance (then the major
political party in the Federation of Malaya, a coalition of the
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Malayan Chinese
Association and Malayan Indian Congress), that an independent
Constitutional Commission should be appointed “to make recom-
mendations for a form of constitution for a fully self-governing
and independent Federation of Malaya within the Commonwealth”.
Consequently, the Reid Constitutional Commission was formed.
Its chairman, Lord Reid, and one other member were nominated
by the United Kingdom, the remaining three members by Australia,
India and Pakistan. The Commission travelled around Malaysia,
holding public discussions and debates, and collecting views from
political parties, organisations and individuals.33 It issued its
report together with a draft constitution borrowed mostly from
the Indian Constitution on 21 February 1957. For the first time
it was proposed that the Constitution should contain a guarantee
of fundamental liberties.
Between 22 February and 27 April 1957, a Working Party was
appointed in the Federation to examine the report. It consisted of
the High Commissioner, four representatives of the Malay Rulers,
four Alliance Government representatives, the Chief Secretary
and the Attorney-General. The Working Party held a series of
meetings, then in early May 1957 presented a report to the Con-
ference of Rulers and Federal Executive Council. A delegation
returned to London to discuss the Reid Commission report and
agree on final details. Some amendments were made to the draft
Constitution, but its basic structure followed the recommenda-
tions of the Reid Constitutional Commission. Talks culminated
33 Tun Dr Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim, “The Influence of the American
Constitution on the Malaysian Constitution” [1976] 2 MLJ xxxii at xxxiii.
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in the signing of the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1957, which
contained in one of its schedules the new Federal Constitution.
The British Parliament passed the UK Federation of Malaya
Independence Act 1957, and an Order in Council made under
the Act gave force of law to the Federal Constitution set out in the
Agreement. In Malaysia the Federal Constitution Ordinance 1957
was enacted by the Federal Legislative Council. In each of the
Malay states, state enactments were passed to approve and give
force of law to the Federal Constitution, which finally came into
force on 31 August 1957.
Singapore had been a British colony since 1946. But full internal
self-government was achieved in 1958, and Singapore was given
a new Constitution. This Constitution contained no fundamental
liberties. In 1963, on becoming a state of the Federation of Malay-
sia, Singapore gained a state Constitution which Hickling calls
the “immediate parent” of Singapore’s modern Constitution.34
As it was designed to interlock into Malaysia’s federal government
structure, it also contained no fundamental liberties since these
were already provided for in Part II of the Malaysian Federal
Constitution.
Two years later, on 9 August 1965, Singapore declared its inde-
pendence from the Federation of Malaysia. Needing a working
constitution at short notice, the Republic of Singapore Inde-
pendence Act 1965 (No 9 of 1965) was enacted by the Singapore
Parliament, assented to by the President on 23 December 1965
and made retrospective to 9 August 1965. Section 6(1) provided:
The provisions of the Constitution of Malaysia, other than those
set out in subsection (3), shall continue in force in Singapore
subject to such modifications, adaptations and qualifications
and exceptions as may be necessary to bring them into conform-
ity with the independent status of Singapore upon separation
from Malaysia.
34 Hickling, Essays in Singapore Law, supra, n 32 at 29.
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In this unusual manner, Part II of the Malaysian Constitution deal-
ing with fundamental liberties (now Part IV) was introduced into
our Constitution. In December 1965 a Constitutional Commission,
chaired by the then Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin, was appointed
to formulate constitutional safeguards for multi-racialism and
equality of all citizens whether belonging to majority or minority
groups.35 The Commission obtained representations from the
public through written memoranda and public hearings, and held
private discussions among its members.36 Presenting its report37
on 27 August 1966, it generally approved the fundamental liberties
imported from the Malaysian Constitution. The government made
its views on the report known to Parliament on 21 December 1966,
and debates on it were held in March 1967. Except for a few
recommendations, the Wee Commission report was accepted.
The likely sources of information on the intention of the framers
and adopters of our Constitution are thus (1) records of the private
deliberations of the Reid Commission 1957, Wee Commission 1966
and other committees, (2) reports of their recommendations, and
(3) records of legislative debates on these reports in Malaysia
and Singapore.38
Unfortunately, unlike the United States and India, no records
of either Constitutional Commission’s closed-door meetings were
ever published. We have little idea how members of the Commis-
sions viewed the fundamental liberties they proposed. While both
Commissions did publish their final recommendations, remarks
on fundamental liberties were limited to very general statements
35
36
37
38
Speech of the Minister for Law and National Development to Parliament
on 22 December 1965. See the Wee Commission report, infra, n 37 at 1
para 1.
Wee Commission report, ibid at 1 paras 3-5.
Report of the Constitutional Commission 1966 (Chairman: Wee Chong
Jin CJ), reprinted in Tan, Yeo & Lee, supra, n 2 at 794 (Appendix D).
See the Appendix, infra.
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of policy or bare enumeration of the rights themselves. While
Parliamentary debates on the Commission reports were recorded
verbatim, they are unhelpful in practically all cases for interpreting
the fundamental liberties because Ministers concentrated mainly
on other matters.39 For the most part, the fundamental liberties
recommended for inclusion in the Constitution were accepted
without any comment on their meaning or scope. Constitutional
scholar Harry Groves comments thus on the adoption of the
Constitution recommended by the Reid Commission:
As contemporary evidence of the meanings of controversial
provisions the debates on the Constitution in the Legislative
Council [of Malaya] are not too helpful... No real discussion
was had of its provisions. The Chief Minister restated some of
them; but members were generally keenly conscious of the fact
that they were expected to act favorably and quickly on the
Constitution as a whole. Indeed, any desire to delay impending
Merdeka by constitutional controversy was pointedly eschewed
by more than one speaker, most of whom rose simply to defend,
or occasionally attack, not to debate or expound or clarify any
section of, the Constitution. Many took the floor for the sole
purpose of congratulating the Chief Minister.40
Compared to the United States and India, this paucity of historical
sources makes it extremely difficult to determine what the framers
and adopters of our Constitution actually intended with regard
to the fundamental liberties.
2. Conceptual Difficulties
Even if a reliable historical record existed, the intentionalist ap-
proach has fundamental problems. Judith Baer believes that a
complete record can never be a record of original intention. People
39
40
Ibid.
Groves, supra, n 32 at 214.
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do not say everything that is on their minds, so a record is at
best a reporting of what was said, not what was meant. When
legislators speak in Parliament, they do so not to interpret pro-
visions but to get them passed or dismissed. Thus they may well
keep to themselves certain thoughts for fear of an unwanted
reaction from their colleagues. Thoughts may also go unexpressed
if they are so obvious in a given time or place that they do not
need to be said. However such thoughts may not be clear to others
reading the debates at a later date. Also, debates are normally
dominated by a few vocal individuals. The majority’s silence leaves
much unsaid.41
Then there is the problem of whose intention actually counts.
Should we concentrate on the intentions of the persons who
framed or drafted the Constitution, or on the intentions of the
adopters – the members of legislatures who approved the draft
by voting it into law?42 Even treating both intentions as equally
relevant does not solve all our problems. The adopters of Singa-
pore’s Constitution are clearly our Members of Parliament. But
our Bill of Rights stems from the Malaysian Federal Constitution,
and ultimately the Indian Constitution. It is an interesting question
whether the views of the framers and adopters of these foreign
constitutions are relevant in interpreting corresponding Articles
of the Singapore Constitution.
Even if we can identify with certainty whose intent is relevant,
we may still be unable to identify a clear collective intention
as to a provision’s meaning because of conflicting intents. For
example, of all the Members of Parliament who vote in favour
of a Constitutional provision, if 50% intend the provision to mean
one thing, 30% to mean another, and 20% to mean a third thing,
what is the relevant intent? In fact, many adopters probably have
no specific intent regarding a provision. They supported it believing
41
42
Baer, supra, n 29 at 59.
C Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989) at 272.
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that one or more of their colleagues had thought adequately about
its meaning. It may be that their intent was simply to complete
the debate so they could go home for dinner.43
The framers and adopters may also have had intents at different
levels of generality. Take for instance Art 12(1) of the Singapore
Constitution which guarantees equality before the law and equal
protection of the law. From the Reid and Wee Commission reports
and the Parliamentary debates on these reports, it is clear that
many of the framers and adopters saw that Art 12(1) (and its
Malaysian counterpart Art 8(1)) promoted the need to ensure
fairness to racial and religious minorities. This is a fairly low level
of generality. But it is not unlikely that some framers and adopters
understood Art 12(1) to promote equality before the law and equal
protection of the laws at a higher level of generality, which would
include protection of other groups such as women which may not
be outright minorities when compared to the population as a
whole but are minorities in certain situations such as employment.
In fact it is submitted that such an interpretation is mandated by
the Constitution, otherwise Art 12(1) would be meaningless, given
the presence of Art 12(2) which already prohibits governmental
discrimination against persons on the basis inter alia of race and
religion. Also, Art 16, which guarantees educational rights, is
expressly stated to be “without prejudice to the generality of
Article 12”.
Because it is difficult to identify the existence of collective
intent and its level of generality, any doctrine of constitutional
interpretation based wholly on framers’ and adopters’ intent is
doomed to failure. Due to these inherent uncertainties, historical
records can be interpreted in conflicting yet plausible ways by
different interpreters. In effect the problem of interpretation is not
solved. The focus merely shifts from the constitutional text to
historical records on the text.
43 Baker, ibid.
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Finally, it is also highly plausible that the intention of the
framers and adopters of the Constitution was not for their own
views on its scope and meaning to control its interpretation at all,
but to delegate discretion to the courts to interpret the Constitution
based on prevailing social conditions.44 This is supported by the
use of broad, general language in the Constitution instead of a
more precise wording. Social mores change, and it is more sensible
to treat the Constitution as laying down a dynamic framework
which can be used to solve present-day problems, rather than a
rigid one which provides only answers to questions that nobody
is asking any longer. For instance, when drafting Art 12(2), the
framers of the Malaysian Federal Constitution made a conscious
effort not to follow the Indian Constitution, specifically excluding
gender or sex from the list of forbidden classifications. Are we
to take it that gender discrimination which may have been more
acceptable in the past is forever written into the Constitution
though it does not accord with present-day thinking? The Amer-
ican experience shows that Constitutions are to be treated as living
organisms which grow and evolve with the times. In 1872 the
Supreme Court declared in Bradwell v Illinois45 that a statute
prohibiting women from practising law was constitutional because:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized
a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of
man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and
defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organisa-
tion, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
44
45
See Powell, “The Original Understanding of Original Intent” (1988) 98 Harv
L Rev 885.
(1872) 83 US (16 Wall) 130 at 141. Now see s 11(3) of the Legal Profession
Act (Cap 161, 1994 Ed): “A person shall not be disqualified by sex from
being admitted and enrolled as an advocate and solicitor.”
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properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.
The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which
belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant
to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent
career from that of her husband.
How archaic this view seems today, in an era of increasing gender
equality. It would be repugnant to interpret the Constitution in
accordance with such outdated views, especially when the text
does not mandate such a reading.
Another example: Raoul Berger suggests that the original pur-
pose of the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause was to
protect the Civil Rights Act 1866 from repeal. If this is correct, the
framers’ intent was to prohibit discrimination relating only to rights
to contract, to own property and to have access to the courts,
provided for in the 1866 Act.46 But American courts have never
interpreted equal protection so narrowly. In Plessy v Ferguson47
the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana law of 1890 requiring
“equal but separate” accommodations for white and “coloured”
railroad passengers. Plessy, who alleged he was “seven-eights
Caucasian and one-eighth African blood”, was arrested for refusing
to leave a seat in a coach for whites. Held the Supreme Court:
“The object of the [14th] Amendment was undoubtedly to en-
force the absolute equality of the races before the law, but in
the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based on colour, or to enforce social, as distinguished
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon
terms unsatisfactory to either.” Subsequently, even the “equal but
separate” doctrine was struck down. In Brown v Board of Edu-
cation,48 black schoolchildren were denied admission to schools
attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting
46
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Berger, supra, n 27 at 19.
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segregation according to race. Overruling Plessy, the Supreme
Court stated that to separate black children from others of similar
age and qualification solely because of their race generated a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
could “affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.” Following Brown, applications of the “equal but separate”
doctrine in other public facilities were declared void.
Plessy and Brown were referred to locally in PP v Su Liang
Yu,49 the court recognising that “values may change from time
to time”. The court also detected shifts in attitude and approach
in decisions of the Indian Supreme Court. These cases forcefully
make the point that it is wrong to interpret the Constitution so
as to freeze it in history.
B. Textualism
A textualist interprets the Constitution by construing its text. The
words used in framing each Article are considered the primary or
even the exclusive source of higher law. Paul Brest50 understands
textualists to favour this form of interpretation because of the
following rationales:
ii.
iii.
There is some definitional or supralegal principle that only
a written text can impose constitutional obligations.51
The framers and adopters of the Constitution probably
intended for it to be interpreted according to a textualist
canon.
The text of the Constitution is the surest guide to the in-
tentions of the framers and adopters as to what it means.
This is the most important rationale for textualism. It stems
49
50
51
[1976] 2 MLJ 128 at 130 (HC, Ipoh).
Brest, supra, n 26 at 205.
Supra, nn 8-9, and the accompanying text.
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from the rudimentary tenet of statutory interpretation that
a provision is to be interpreted with reference to the words
used in framing it and not to any extrinsic materials, because
it is through the text and the text alone that Parliament has
chosen to make known its intentions.
The strictest form of textualism is literalism – a narrow and
literal construction of words and phrases. It was frequently used
in the early days of the American Constitution52 principally be-
cause the only rules of interpretation that judges of the time were
familiar with were common law canons of statutory interpretation.
But literalism only applies where the text of the Constitution is
free from ambiguity. When the scope of a phrase is broad and
imprecise – examples from our own Constitution include “personal
liberty”, “equal protection” and “in accordance with law” –
literalism is of little help in determining if a particular issue before
the court warrants constitutional protection.53
In contrast, moderate textualism takes into account the “open-
textured” nature of certain Articles of the Constitution, ie the fact
that they are broadly-worded, and their linguistic and social con-
text. Apart from giving prominence to the constitutional text,54
moderate textualists feel that judges should examine the form of
government which it incorporates55 as well as cases interpreting
52
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Eg Sturges v Crowningshield (1819) 17 US (4 Wheat) 122 at 202-3 per
Marshall CJ: “[A]lthough the spirit of an instrument, especially of a con-
stitution, is to be respected not less than its letter, yet the spirit is to be
collected chiefly from its words...”
Brest, supra, n 26 at 222. See also supra, n 42 at 272.
Goldstein, supra, n 8 at 4, 154; Laurence H Tribe & Michael C Dorf,
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See eg McCulloch v Maryland (1819) 17 US (4 Wheat) 316; Barron v
Baltimore (1833) 32 US (7 Peters) 243; American Communications Asso-
ciation v Douds (1980) 339 US 382 at 453 (Black J, dissenting).
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it to discover the basic principles underlying it. These basic prin-
ciples can then be applied to novel situations.
The political framework established by our Constitution embod-
ies the concept of separation of powers and limited government.
Political power is divided between the executive (Art 23) and
legislature (Art 38 read with Art 58) on the one hand, and the
judiciary (Art 93) on the other. It has been said that judicial
review is “undemocratic” and contrary to the concept of repres-
entative government because it permits an unelected group of
people to uphold minority rights in the face of majority opinion.
But to accept this criticism is to forget that this is the very system
of government founded by our Constitution, which is the voice
of a sovereign people deciding how they will be ruled. The Con-
stitution establishes that the majority’s power, exercised through
its representatives in the executive and legislature, is not to succeed
in all situations but is to be balanced against judicial power exer-
cised to protect minority interests.56 On the other hand, judicial
power is controlled by explicit Constitutional limitations which
allow the legislature to curtail fundamental liberties in appro-
priate situations, such as where public order or public health
are threatened.
How should judges go about identifying constitutional rights
within a concept like “personal liberty”? The common law approach
suggests that they must identify the principles underlying prior
related decisions, and reformulate them in a way that adequately
explains the rights already protected without referring to the right
claimed to exist. This done, the right should be tested against the
principles identified. If it is encompassed within the general prin-
ciple, then it is a fundamental liberty. If not, it is to be rejected.57
In determining what are basic principles, judges cannot be blind
to norms of the community, expressed through public attitudes
56
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towards issues, legislation, and decided cases. However an im-
portant caveat is in order. Judges must prefer deep principles over
transient majority preferences. They must not act as a mere reflex
of popular passions and opinion, but must preserve fundamental
and enduring national values “against the assaults of opportunism,
the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroach-
ments, the scorn and derision of those who have no patience
with general principles.” They are to apply not the hasty and
unconsidered impressions of crowds but the stable underlying
moral convictions of “those sections of the crowd whose im-
pressions have ripened into genuine opinion.”58
Of course changing societal values may prove a judge to be
wrong or cause his views to become hopelessly out of date. But
this does not mean that judicial review has failed. In a sense,
judges are established by the Constitution as neutral umpires or
referees to resolve issues by giving authoritative statements and
achieving finality in disputes for the time being. They are not
meant to lay down perfect rules for all time.59 Fortunately, the
Constitution’s open-textured nature permits errors of judgment
to be corrected. It is submitted that moderate textualism is the
correct approach to constitutional interpretation as it best accords
with the structure of the Constitution.
C. Impact of S 9A of the Interpretation Act60
Our conclusions on intentionalism and textualism are validated
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by recent legal developments. The Interpretation (Amendment) Act
1993 (No 11 of 1993) inserted a new s 9A into the Interpretation
Act (Cap 1, 1985 Rev Ed), establishing that in Singapore a pur-
posive approach is to be used to interpret statutes, and that courts
may refer to extrinsic materials to resolve ambiguities:61
9A(1).
(2).
In the interpretation of a provision of written law,
an interpretation that would promote the purpose or
object underlying the written law (whether that purpose
or object is expressly stated in the written law or not)
shall be preferred to an interpretation that would not
promote that purpose or object.
. . . in the interpretation of a provision of a written law,
if any material not forming any part of the written
law is capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the
meaning of the provision, consideration may be given
to that material –
(a)
(b)
to confirm that the meaning of the provision is
the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the
provision taking into account its context in the
written law and the purpose or object underlying
the written law; or
to ascertain the meaning of the provision when –
(i) the provision is ambiguous or obscure; or
(ii) the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text
of the provision taking into account its
context in the written law and the purpose
or object underlying the written law leads
to a result that is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.
Without limiting the generality of s 9A(2), sub-s (3) provides
examples of extrinsic materials that may be referred to. These
61 Shortly before s 9A came into force, this rule was affirmed in the common
law by Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] 3 WLR 1032 (HL), applied
in Singapore by Tan Boon Yong v Comptroller of Income Tax [1993]
2 SLR 48 (CA).
184 Singapore Law Review (1995)
include the explanatory statement in a Bill containing the provi-
sion to be interpreted, and the speech made in Parliament by a
Minister moving a motion that the Bill containing the provision
be read for a second time. Read together, ss 9A(2) and (3) permit
the court to refer to all the materials examined previously which
might assist in interpreting the Constitution.62
Section 9A is relevant to constitutional interpretation because
“written law” is defined by s 2(1) of the Interpretation Act to
include the Constitution. This was recently confirmed by Con-
stitutional Reference No 1 of 1995,63 which is the first application
of s 9A to the Constitution. In its decision, the Constitutional Tri-
bunal considered as well-established the principle that a purposive
interpretation should be adopted in interpreting the Constitution
to give effect to the intent and will of Parliament. It also stated
that legislative material such as speeches in Parliament and other
contemporaneous documents can be resorted to. Therefore courts
must employ an interpretation that promotes the purpose or
object underlying the Constitution or particular Articles of the
Constitution.64 It is submitted that this does not mandate in-
tentionalism. In laying down the purposive approach, s 9A(1)
merely expresses the general philosophy and spirit behind statutory
62
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interpretation.65 The difficulties described above with regard to
determining the legislature’s intention still remain.66 In fact, Par-
liament’s choice of a broad wording over a more precise one in
Arts 9(1) and 12(1) suggests strongly that their purpose or object
is to ensure that individuals’ rights of personal liberty and equality
are generally not to be impaired, and that the scope of these
liberties is to be determined by the courts when issues arise.
Section 9A(2)(a) rejects literalism since extrinsic materials reveal-
ing a provision’s purpose or object may be considered even if
just to confirm that words are to be interpreted according to their
ordinary meaning.67 Therefore the approach that accords best
with s 9A is moderate textualism. However this approach must
be adjusted since, where open-textured and ambiguous provi-
sions are encountered, s 9A(2)(b) permits reference to extrinsic
65
66
67
Beckman & Phang, supra, n 60 at 83.
Supra, nn 41-49, and the accompanying text.
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Motion 39/1994, 11 May 1994, the High Court stated that s 9A does not
in any way affect the rule stated by Tindal CJ in the Sussex Peerage Case
(1844) 8 ER 1034 at 1057: “If the words of the statute are in themselves
precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound
those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone
do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt
arises from the terms employed by the legislature, it has always been held
a safe mean of collecting the intention, to call in aid the ground and cause
of making the statute...” The court concluded that when the words of the
statute are clear the courts can neither apply the purposive approach nor
call in aid the extrinsic material enumerated in s 9A. This approach has been
rejected by Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995, supra, n 63 at 211F-H.
The Constitutional Tribunal held that it is wrong to adopt a literal approach
even if there is no ambiguity or inconsistency, if the literal approach does
not give effect to the will and intent of Parliament. Beckman & Phang have
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materials.68 But as such materials are unlikely to be “capable of
assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning” of the fundamental
liberties in our Constitution,69 it is submitted that courts are
probably not permitted to consider them under s 9A(2).
III. MODERATE TEXTUALISM APPLIED:
THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY IN ART 9(1)
Article 9(1) of the Constitution, identical to Art 5(1) of the Malay-
sian Federal Constitution, reads: “No person shall be deprived of
his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law”. It bears
a resemblance to its progenitors, Art 21 of the Indian Constitution:
“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law”, and the 5th and
14th Amendments of the Constitution of the United States of
America, the relevant parts of which provide that no person shall
be deprived “of his life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law”.
Local courts have repeatedly warned against relying on cases
from foreign jurisdictions to interpret the fundamental liberties
in the Singapore Constitution.70 Our judges have rightly asserted
68
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1 MLJ 293 at 296 col 2B-C (SC, Malaysia) and Teo Soh Lung v Minister
for Home Affairs [1989] 2 MLJ 449 at 459 col 2B (HC, Singapore), which
rejected use of the Reid Commission report as the basis for constitutional
interpretation, can no longer be considered as good law.
Supra, nn 41-49, and the accompanying text.
Government of the State of Kelantan v Government of the Federation
of Malaya [1963] MLJ 355 at 358: “[T]he Constitution is primarily to be
interpreted within its own four walls and not in the light of analogies drawn
from other countries such as Great Britain, the United States of America
or Australia.” See also Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negri,
Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 at 141, 147 (FC, Malaysia); Loh Kooi Choon
v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 at 188-89 (FC, Malaysia);
16 Sing LR Rediscovering the Constitution 187
that in the end it is the Constitution itself that is to be interpreted
and applied, and that its text can never be overridden by the
extraneous principles of other Constitutions.71 But it is imprudent
to reject outright constitutional developments in other jurisdictions
as our Constitution shares many fundamental principles with
with foreign constitutions, especially those which are its fore-
runners. Furthermore, Singapore and Malaysia have not developed
a sufficient body of authoritative decisions in many areas of con-
stitutional law to enable principles to be developed independently
by analogy and extension. If judges are not to pull interpretations
out of the air, recourse to judgments from foreign jurisdictions
is inevitable. Indeed, as these two Constitutions draw inspiration
from the Indian and United States Constitutions, reference to
cases from those jurisdictions is only natural.72
71
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A. “Personal Liberty”
To date, the only local case properly considering the scope of
“personal liberty” in the Constitution is Government of Malaysia
v Loh Wai Kong.73 In this case, the defendant was denied renewal
of his passport because of criminal charges pending against him.
He asserted that he had a fundamental right to travel abroad
under Art 5(1) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution (Singapore’s
Art 9(1)), and that the denial of a passport to him violated this
right. The Federal Court of Malaysia rejected this argument. It
began with the premise that:
It is well-settled that the meaning of words used in any portion
of a statute – and the same principle applies to a constitution –
depends on the context in which they are placed, that words
used in an Act take their colour from the context in which they
appear and that they may be given a wider or more restricted
meaning than they ordinarily bear if the context requires it.74
It went on to consider the other clauses of Art 5 which deal with
an arrested person’s right to be informed as soon as may be of
the grounds of his arrest and to consult and be defended by his
own lawyer, his right to be released without undue delay and in
any case within 24 hours to be produced before a magistrate,
and his right not to be further detained in custody without the
magistrate’s authority. Noting that “these are all rights relating
to the person or body of the individual” (original emphasis), the
court declared it was “convinced that [Art 5(1)] only guarantees
a person... freedom from being ‘unlawfully detained’”, and
that it did not encompass the right to travel overseas and to be
issued a passport. It supported this reading with Mukherjee J’s
remarks in the Indian case AK Gopalan v State of Madras,75
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which defined “personal liberty” as the “antithesis of physical
restraint or coercion” and “a personal right not to be subjected
to imprisonment, arrest or other physical coercion in any manner
that does not admit of legal justification”.76
It is respectfully submitted that while the result in the case is
correct, the Federal Court achieved it through an undesirable
interpretation of “personal liberty”. The ordinary, natural meaning
of the phrase does not suggest any such limitation on its breadth.
Section 9A(4)(a) of the Interpretation Act exhorts judges to be
mindful of the desirability of persons being able to rely on the
ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of a provision taking into
account its context and the purpose or object underlying the
written law.77 It is submitted that the word “personal” does not
change the meaning of “liberty”; the liberties possessed by indi-
viduals can be “personal” without having a physical effect on
their bodies. It does not help, and indeed it is wrong, to constrain
a broad expression by selecting one particular meaning out of a
number of equally plausible meanings and apply that meaning
alone as the correct interpretation. In McCulloch v Maryland,78
Marshall CJ commented that:
Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys
to the mind, in all situations, one single definite idea; and
76
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considerations so clearly stated in s 9A(4) of the Interpretation Act, namely,
the desirability of the public being able to rely on the ordinary meaning
conveyed by the statutory provision and the need to avoid prolonged and
wasteful litigation.”
(1819) 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 at 414-15.
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nothing is more common than to use words in a figurative sense.
Almost all compositions contain words, which taken in their
rigorous sense, would convey a meaning different from that
which is obviously intended. It is essential to just construction
that many words which import something excessive, should be
understood in a more mitigated sense – in that sense which
common usage justifies. . . . [In the interpretation of a word]
the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them,
are all to be taken into view.
No doubt the sub-sections of Art 9 of the Singapore Constitution
deal with physical detention, but as Lord Diplock pointed out in
Ong Ah Chuan v PP,79 the Constitution should not be treated as
ordinary legislation but “as sui generis, calling for principles of
interpretation of its own, suitable to its character... without
necessary acceptance of all the presumptions that are relevant to
legislation of private law.” Article 9(1) is pitched at a high level of
generality; its sub-sections should be read as specific applications
of the rights of life and personal liberty considered vital enough to
be explicitly articulated in the Constitution. It is neither stretching
nor perverting the language of the Constitution80 to interpret
“personal liberty” in this manner.
The legislative history of Art 21 of the Indian Constitution
shows that the word “personal” was added before “liberty” to
avoid a construction so wide as to include the freedoms dealt with
in what is now Art 19.81 But can we safely assume that the intent
79
80
81
Supra, n 17 at 70 col 2D.
Courts are “not at liberty to stretch or pervert the language of the Con-
stitution in the interest of any legal or constitutional theory or even for the
purposes of supplying omissions or correcting supposed errors”: Merdeka
University v Government of Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 356 at 360.
HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary (3rd ed,
1983), vol 1 at 692 para 11.4; Gopalan, supra, n 75 at 37 para 12 per
Kania CJ, at 53 para 58 per Fazl AH J, at 70 para 105 per Patanjali Sastri J,
at 97 para 178 per Mukherjea J, and at 110 para 219 per Das J.
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of our Constitution’s drafters towards Art 9(1) was the same as
that of their Indian counterparts? Even if we can, given the near-
identical wording between Art 9(1) and India’s Art 21, the only
implication we can draw is that “personal liberty” possessed by
all persons in Singapore does not include the liberties reserved to
citizens under Art 14. Singapore’s Art 14 roughly corresponds to
Art 19(1) as the sub-sections of Art 19(1) encompass, inter alia,
rights to freedom of speech and expression, to assemble peacefully
without arms, and to form associations or unions. There is no
suggestion that “personal liberty” is limited to freedom from
physical restraint, as was suggested by Loh Wai Kong.82
The Reid Commission report, though, seems to support the
view that it was the framers’ original intention to limit Art 9(1)
in the Loh Wai Kong sense: “We recommend (art 5) [Singapore’s
Art 9] provisions against detention without legal authority of
a magistrate...” However, the Commission went on: “We also
recommend (art 8) [Art 12] provisions against discrimination by
law on the ground of religion, race, descent, or place of birth,
and discrimination on these grounds by any Government or public
authority in making appointments or contracts or permitting
82 See Gopalan, ibid at 110 para 219 per Das J: “[T]he Constitution as finally
passed has in Art 21 used the words ‘personal liberty’ which have a definite
connotation in law which I have explained. It does not mean only liberty
of the person but it means liberty or the rights attached to the person
(jus personarum).” Earlier, at 108 para 214, he stated that jus personarum
included the right to life; the right not to have one’s body touched, violated,
arrested or imprisoned; the right not to be injured or maimed except under
authority of law; and “varieties of other rights which are also attributes of
the freedom of the person”, some of which are so important and fundamental
that they are regarded and valued as separate and independent rights apart
from the freedom of the person. Fazl Ali J at 53 para 58 took a more
extreme position: “Personal liberty and personal freedom, in spite of the
use of the word ‘personal’, are, as we find in several books, sometimes used
in a wide sense and embrace freedom of speech, freedom of association,
etc. These rights are some of the most valuable phases or elements of liberty
and they do not cease to be so by the addition of the word ‘personal’.”
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entry to any educational institutions, or granting financial aid
in respect of pupils or students (art 12) [Art 16].”83 Drawing a
parallel between Art 9 and Art 12 shows the true meaning of the
Commission’s statements. While Art 12(1) guarantees equality
before the law and equal protection of the law to all, Art 12(2)
provides that there shall be no discrimination against Singapore
citizens on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of
birth for certain specified purposes. If the intent of the Con-
stitution’s framers towards Art 12(1) is to be found in the Reid
Commission report, the effect of Art 12(1) would merely be to
prevent discrimination against citizens on the grounds stipulated
in Art 12(2) and no others. There is no warrant in law or policy
for such a restrictive reading: Art 12(1) has been applied to forms
of discrimination not enunciated expressly in Art 12(2). Further-
more, to interpret Arts 9(1) and 12(1) in this way would deprive
them of all useful purpose. Parliament cannot be taken to have
enacted meaningless provisions in the Constitution. It is far more
likely that the Reid Commission was simply summarising salient
elements of the fundamental liberties in the Constitution and not
attempting in any way to lay down their scope.
United States case law establishes that individuals may be
deprived of liberty by being deprived of freedom of action by
personal restraint as well as by having their freedom of choice
and action limited by legislation which makes it impossible or
illegal for them to engage in certain types of activity.84 In Munn
v Illinois85 the court pronounced:
83
84
85
Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1956-57 Report, ch IX
(“Fundamental Rights”), para 162. See Tan, Yeo & Lee, supra, n 2 at 743.
John E Nowak & Ronald D Rotunda, Constitutional Law (4th ed, 1991)
at 496 §13.4.
(1877) 94 US 113 per Field and Strong JJ (dissenting). This definition of
“liberty” has been applied in India by Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh
(1963) AIR SC 1295 at 1301 para 15, 1302 para 17; Satwant Singh v Assistant
Passport Officer, New Delhi (1967) AIR SC 1836 at 1844 para 28; and
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By the term “liberty” . . . something more is meant than mere
freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It
means freedom to go where one may choose, and to act in such
a manner, not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as
his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness;
that is, to pursue such callings and avocations as may be most
suitable to develop his capacities, and give to them their highest
enjoyment.
Our courts should not fetter themselves prematurely by a limited
reading of “personal liberty” but should adopt this generous view,
developing the concept using the time-honoured common law
incremental approach.86
Our interpretation of “personal liberty” is supported by deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of India which decisively rejected the
narrow definition in Gopalan’s case. It was held in RC Cooper
v Union of India (The Bank Nationalisation Case)87 and Maneka
Gandhi v Union of India88 that India’s Art 21 represents a general
Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration (1975) AIR SC 1675 at 1731 para 226.
A similarly wide definition of liberty was applied in Meyer v Nebraska
(1923) 262 US 390. The majority judgment in Munn by Waite CJ did not
expound on the meaning of liberty, but simply held that the State may
regulate an individual’s use of his property if regulation is necessary for
the public good. On the facts, it was constitutional for the State to regulate
the fees payable to individuals who had a monopoly on elevators used for
storing grain.
Note that the United States Supreme Court has held that not all areas
of human activity can be called “liberty”. In Board of Regents v Roth (1972)
408 US 564 the applicant, hired to teach at a state-run university for one
year, was informed without explanation that he would not be rehired. The
university was acting completely within its legal rights. The court held that
it would stretch the concept of liberty too far to suggest that a person is
deprived of “liberty” when he simply is not rehired by the state but remains
as free as before to seek other employment.
Tribe & Dorf, supra, n 54 at 63.
[1970] AIR SC 564.
[1978] AIR SC 597.
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statement of the right to personal liberty while Art 19(1) contains
specific attributes of personal liberty. Said Bhagwati J in the
latter case: “The expression ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 is of
the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go
to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them have
been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given
additional protection under Article 19.”89
B. “Save in Accordance with Law” and
Substantive Natural Justice90
Article 9(1) ends with the phrase “save in accordance with law”.
For a time this was taken to mean that so long as the legislature
validly enacted a law, this law could derogate freely from life or
personal liberty. This approach was typified by such cases as
Comptroller-General of Inland Revenue v NP91 and Arumugam
Pillai v Government of Malaysia.92 The Public Prosecutor in Ong
Ah Chuan93 attempted the same argument, contending that since
89
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93
Ibid at 622 per Bhagwati J writing for Untwalia and Murtaza Fazal Ali JJ,
and himself. Bhagwati J disapproved the majority’s definition of “personal
liberty” in Gopalan, stating that there was no definite pronouncement on
it in that case since the point was not in issue.
Tan, Yeo & Lee, supra, n 2 at 439-41.
[1973] 1 MLJ 165 at 166 (HC).
[1975] 2 MLJ 29 (FC, Malaysia). NP and Arumugam Pillai involved Art 13(1)
of the Malaysian Federal Constitution (not in the Singapore Constitution):
“No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law.”
Both cases applied Tinsa Maw Naing v Commissioner of Police, Rangoon
[1950] Burma LR 17 which interpreted s 16 of the Burmese Constitution:
“No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty.. . save in accordance
with law.” This case held that “law” meant the “will of the legislature enacted
in due form, provided that such enactment is within the competence of
the legislature.”
Supra, n 17 at 70 col 2F-H.
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“written law” is defined in Art 2(1) of the Constitution to mean
“this Constitution and all Acts and Ordinances and subsidiary
legislation for the time being in force in Singapore”, and “law”
is defined as including written law, the requirements of the Con-
stitution are satisfied if deprivation of life or liberty is carried out
in accordance with a provision contained in any Act passed by
Parliament, however arbitrary or contrary to the fundamental
rules of natural justice it might be.
This argument was flatly rejected by the Privy Council as
begging the question. “Written law” includes Acts passed by Par-
liament only to the extent that they are “in force” in Singapore,
and Art 4 provides that any law enacted by the legislature after
the commencement of the Constitution which is inconsistent with
it is void to the extent of the inconsistency. Therefore use of the
word “law” in Arts 9(1) and 12(1) does not relieve the court of
its duty to determine the constitutionality of the written law.
Instead, Ong Ah Chuan and its sister case Haw Tua Tau v
PP94 established that in a Westminster constitution, particularly
in the part dealing with fundamental liberties, references to “law”
must refer to a system of law incorporating fundamental rules of
natural justice.95 In those cases the judges were referring to rules
of natural justice which ensure procedural fairness. This is the
sense in which natural justice has always been understood in
Singapore. But might natural justice not have a substantive aspect
as well? This would entitle courts to examine whether it is appro-
priate for the legislature to deprive individuals of certain aspects
of their personal liberty, and the manner in which such deprivation
is achieved.
94
95
[1981] 2 MLJ 49 (PC on appeal from Singapore).
Ong Ah Chuan, supra, n 17 at 71 col 1B; Haw Tua Tau, ibid at 50 col 11-
col 2A. Affirmed in Chin Siew Noi v PP, Criminal Case 6/1990, 26 February
1993 (HC).
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Harding96 rejects the idea of “substantive natural justice”. He
asserts that the only meaning of natural justice known to the
common law is the idea of fair procedure, and that “this is the
only sense which is clear enough to permit natural justice to
function properly as a constitutional concept.” Natural justice
can only operate in a substantive manner in the sense that the
substance of an Act has no meaning without procedure: “the
medium is the message”.97 Harding supports this by reference
to Art 12(1). Lord Diplock in Ong Ah Chuan extended natural
justice to Art 12(1), which is designed to prevent substantively
discriminatory legislation. Harding feels this shows it could not
have been the Privy Council’s intent to apply natural justice in
a substantive sense, since this would mean that the court can strike
down a provision for inconsistency with “natural justice” even if
it satisfies the rational nexus test. He concludes that “Lord Diplock
has not fully appreciated the sweeping potential of his linkage of
equality with natural justice, and intended to refer to Article 12(1)
only by way of comparing its usage of the word law.”98
Harding’s arguments are impressive but not watertight. It is
well-established in equal protection jurisprudence that courts may
declare a provision unconstitutional even though it passes the
rational nexus test if its object is inherently bad.99 In Bidi Supply
Co v Union of India100  Bose J held that:
. . . one can conceive of classifications . . . that will have direct
and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved
and yet which are bad because . . . the object itself is not to be
96
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100
AJ Harding, “Natural Justice and the Constitution” (1981) 23 Mal LR 226.
Ibid at 230.
Ibid at 235.
Huang-Thio Su Mien, “Equal Protection and Rational Classification” [1963]
Public Law 412 at 422, 440. See also the cases cited at 422-29.
[1956] AIR SC 479 at 486 para 18.
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allowed on the ground that it offends Article 14 [Singapore’s
Art 12(1)]. In such a case the object itself must be struck down
and not the mere classification which after all, is only a means
of attaining the end desired.
If the court can strike down a law under Art 12(1) because its
very object is unreasonable and oppressive, there is no reason
why the court should not possess a similar power under Art 9(1).
It is true that at common law natural justice has always been
a procedural concept, but in the United States it has gained a
substantive component through the “due process” doctrine. The
doctrine permits a court to strike down legislation under the 5th
and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution that speak
only of process (or procedure) due to the individual although
the court disagrees with its substance, because some types of law-
making are taken to go beyond any proper sphere of governmental
activity and are incompatible with democratic government and
individual liberty. The premise is that life, liberty or property was
taken away without due process or by an unconstitutional process
because the Constitution never granted the government the ability
to pass such a law.101
There is a line of Malaysian cases holding that local courts have
no power to determine if legal provisions substantively comply
with the constitutional guarantee of life or personal liberty.102
In PP v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris,103 Abdoolcader J remarked:
101
102
103
Nowak & Rotunda, supra, n 84 at 340.
Attorney-General, Malaysia v Chiow Thiam Guan [1983] 1 MLJ 51 (HC,
Kuala Lumpur); PP v Lau Kee Hoo [1983] 1 MLJ 157 (FC); PP v Yee Kim
Seng [1983] 1 MLJ 252 (HC, Ipoh); Che Ani bim Itam v PP [1984] 1 MLJ
113 (FC).
[1976] 2 MLJ 116 (HC, Kuala Lumpur). LA Sheridan & Harry E Groves,
The Constitution of Malaysia (4th ed, 1987) at 44, state that Art 5(1)
of the Malaysian Federal Constitution (Singapore’s Art 9(1)) “does not
import the American concept of due process; it merely makes the acts
described unconstitutional if done unlawfully.” See also Harry E Groves,
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The due process clause and the doctrines of eminent domain
and police power are American constitutional concepts and have
no place, in my view, in our Constitution just as they have none
in the Indian Constitution, as the concepts of these doctrines
are in fact expressly provided for in these Constitutions. For
example, the American doctrine of eminent domain is in fact
embodied in the provisions of Art 13 of our Constitution [the
right to property].104
And recently, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Jabar v PP,105
104
105
“Due Process of Law – A Comparative Study” (1961) 45 Marquette LR
256 at 267-71 who discusses three elements of the United States legal system
which make due process necessary there.
Re Tan Boon Liat [1977] 2 MLJ 108 at 111 col 1G-H (FC, Malaysia) noted
the difference in wording between Art 21 of the Indian Constitution and
Art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution, then continued, “The expression ‘save
in accordance with law’ does not necessarily mean ‘without due process
of law’ as is understood in India by virtue of the words used in its Con-
stitution.” It is submitted the Federal Court was referring to procedural
and not substantive due process. The court was probably making the same
point as Suffian FJ in Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri,
Malaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129 at 148 col 1E-H (FC, Malaysia), who felt that
the difference between Art 21 of the Indian Constitution and Art 5(1) of
the Federal Constitutional law is that Indian Supreme Court takes a stricter
attitude towards compliance with procedure since Art 21 speaks specifically
of “procedure established by law” while Art 5(1) mentions only “law”.
[1995] 1 SLR 617 at 631B. The appellant claimed it was unconstitutional
to carry out the death sentence on him as he had been on death row for
more than five years. The court dismissed the appeal on the basis that
once a sentence is passed and the judicial process is concluded, the court’s
jurisdiction ends and it has no power to order that a sentence of death
be stayed or commuted to life imprisonment. Such power lies exclusively
within the President’s competence under s 8 of the Republic of Singapore
Independence Act (No 9 of 1965, 1985 Rev Ed). Besides, the delay in
execution was due to his solicitors’ failure to file clemency petitions ex-
peditiously and the appellant’s own desire to appeal to the Privy Council:
ibid at 631I-632D.
See also the obiter comment in Ong Ah Chuan: “It was not suggested
on behalf of the appellants that capital punishment is unconstitutional
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apparently harking back to pre-Ortg Ah Chuan days, made the
following obiter statement:
[A]rt 9(1) is different from art 21 in India. Any law which
provides for the deprivation of a person’s life or personal liberty,
is valid and binding so long as it is validly passed by Parliament.
The court is not concerned with whether it is also fair, just and
reasonable as well.
But the rejection of substantive due process in Singapore need
not worry us. We do not need it. The evolution of due process
from a procedural to a substantive concept merely reminds us that
the law is flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances.
Although the legislative history of Art 21 of the Indian Constitu-
tion suggests that its wording was chosen specifically to exclude
the application of the American due process doctrine in India,106
recent cases have begun to apply a parallel doctrine under the
Indian Constitution. For instance, the Indian Supreme Court
106
per se. Such an argument is foreclosed by the recognition in Art 9(1) of
the Constitution that a person may be deprived of life “in accordance with
law”... Whether there should be capital punishment in Singapore and,
if so, for what offences are questions for the legislature of Singapore.”:
supra, n 17 at 71-72.
The draft originally passed by the Indian Constituent Assembly provided
that “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty without
due process of law.” But, as a result of a discussion between the Constitu-
tional Adviser, Sir BN Rao, and Frankfurter J of the United States Supreme
Court, the Drafting Committee suggested inter alia that the words be
changed to “except according to procedure established by law”. According
to Frankfurter J, the original intention of the framers of the American
Constitution was to use due process as a procedural safeguard, and it was
undemocratic to allow the court to strike down government policies on the
basis that they were substantively unconstitutional: Seervai, supra, n 81 at
692-93 para 11.4; Constitutional Law of India (M Hidayatullah ed, 1984)
vol 1 at 493-94; AK Gopalan v State of Madras, supra, n 75 at 38-39
paras 17-19 per Kania CJ, at 56-57 paras 67-68 per Fazl Ali J, at 72-73
paras 108-11 per Patanjali Sastri J, at 97 para 178 per Mukherjea J and
at 115-20 paras 29-40 per Das J.
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invalidated a substantive provision – s 303 of the Indian Penal
Code providing for the mandatory death sentence for murder
committed by a life convict – in Mithu v State of Punjab.107
Similarly, our courts can always recognise that a new independent
doctrine of “substantive natural justice” has developed. Article 9(1)
of our Constitution speaks only of “law” which includes natural
justice. No mental gymnastics are required to construe natural
justice as possessing a substantive component as well as a pro-
cedural one. Some support may be gleaned from Haw Tua Tau.
There, the Privy Council backtracked from its position in Ong
Ah Chuan that “law” in the Constitution includes rules of natural
justice that “formed part and parcel of the common law of Eng-
land that was in operation in Singapore at the commencement
of the Constitution”,108 recognising that rules of natural justice
change with the times, though it spoke in terms of procedural
fairness.109 It could be argued that natural justice should be con-
sidered as having gained a substantive aspect “in the light of the
part it plays in the complete judicial process”. Mere similarity
to the American doctrine should not deter us from pursuing an
analogous doctrine that makes sense. TKK Iyer recognises that
there is an “obvious parallel” between due process and the funda-
mental principles of natural justice, but considers it “misleading”
and “inappropriate” to seek a comparison:
There is no doubt that [judicial review] would cover both the
substantive and procedural provisions of the impugned law. As
far as Article 9(1) is concerned there is no room for making
this distinction with a view to restricting judicial review to the
procedural provisions only... The point is that Article 9(1) con-
notes a judicial inquiry – judicial review – into the “fairness”
107
108
109
(1983) AIR SC 473. For other cases see Mahendra P Singh, VN Shukla’s
Constitution of India (9th ed, 1994) at 172-74.
Supra, n 17 at 71 col 1B.
Supra, n 94 at 53.
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of the law tested against certain principles regarded as funda-
mental to the legal system in theory and in practice. One need
not cloud this proposition by comparisons that advance one
no further forward. Judicial review is judicial review under
whatever name.110
There are policy reasons why substantive natural justice should
claim its place in our Constitution. Firstly, to interpret Art 9(1)
as permitting Parliament to enact any provision that derogates
from an individual’s personal liberty no matter how arbitrary or
oppressive as long as procedural natural justice is observed, drains
it of all content. It is often said that if the people disagree with
such a law, the constitutional way to have it changed is through
the ballot box. This is an unconvincing argument. A government’s
success or failure ought not ride on a few of its many policies.
It is unwise to vote out a government that is doing a good job
in most areas simply because some of its policies are unpopular,
and the electorate knows this. The problem is compounded if
the electorate perceives no credible alternative to the incumbent
government. Allocating competence to the court to test the con-
stitutionality of written law eases the problem by allowing the
reappraisal and fine-tuning of specific policies.
Secondly, we must recall that judicial review is mandated by the
framework of the Constitution, which was passed by the people
through their elected representatives in Parliament.111 Although
the invalidation of legislation has been criticized as a judicial
encroachment into the legislature’s sphere, substantive natural
justice would merely be a full exercise of the judiciary’s proper
constitutional role.
Harding asserts that the idea of substantive natural justice is
too vague to be properly applied as a constitutional concept.
110
111
TKK Iyer, “Article 9(1) and ‘Fundamental Principles of Natural Justice’
in the Constitution of Singapore” (1981) 23 Mal LR 213 at 224-25.
See Part I of this article, supra.
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This need not be so. Indian cases apply a reasonableness test to
determine if procedure under Art 21 is constitutional. This is
the familiar rational nexus test applied to equal protection cases
under Art 14 (Singapore’s Art 12(1)). In Maneka Gandhi112 it
was held that the principle of reasonableness pervades Art 14 like
a “brooding omnipresence”, and procedure contemplated by Art 21
must answer to the test of reasonableness in order to conform
with Art 14. Procedure under scrutiny must be “right and just
and fair” and not “arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive”. This test
has been applied in Malaysia by Che Ani bin Itam.113 It is sub-
mitted that the same test can be applied to determine if legislation
is substantively constitutional.114 Courts would consider if any
112
113
Supra, n 88 at 624 per Bhagwati J, writing for Untwalia and Fazal AH JJ,
and himself. See also Cooper, supra, n 87; Sunil Batra, supra, n 85 at 1732
para 228.
In Che Ani bin Itam, supra, n 102, the issue was whether life imprisonment
under a properly-enacted statute is constitutional. Raja Azlan Shah LP,
applying Ong Ah Chuan, agreed with the Privy Council that “law” in
Art 5(1) includes fundamental rules of natural justice and found that
the statute was not “arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive”. This echoed one of
his earlier cases, Tengku Mahmood Iskandar, supra, n 76, in which he
observed, obiter. “That fundamental right [Art 5(1)] implies that no person
is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body except for a distinct
breach of law proved in a court of law. All this reduces to the minimum
the possibility of arbitrariness and oppression.” See also KV Padmanabha
Rau, Federal Constitution of Malaysia – A Commentary (1986) at 35-36,
who remarks that Raja Azlan Shah LP “pitched on the more accurate
approach by bringing in the test of arbitrariness or oppression.”
Mohd Ariff Yusof, “Saving ‘Save in Accordance With Law’: A Critique
of Kulasingham v Commissioner of Lands, Federal Territory” (1982) 9
JMCL 155 at 166: “Arguably, even ‘substantive due process’ can be safely
incorporated into Articles 5(1) and 13(1) of the Constitution of Malaysia,
even if American examples are discarded. If procedure can be tested against
standards of ‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness’, there seems no rational reason
why these ought not apply with respect to legislative content as well. Far
from unleashing a tide of judicial activism, a judicious use of ‘substantive
due process’ can afford a meaningful role for ‘save in accordance with law’.”
114
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derogation from a plaintiff’s personal liberty bears a reasonable
relation to the purpose sought to be achieved by the government
through the legislation. State of Madras v KG Row115 provides
useful guidelines for the test:
It is important... to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness
whenever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute
impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of
reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.
The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the
underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and
urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the dispro-
portion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time,
should all enter into the judicial verdict.
It is further submitted that where a law derogates from the per-
sonal liberty of “suspect classes”, a higher level of scrutiny of the
law is justified to determine if it is constitutional. In the United
States, a group of persons generally qualifies as a suspect class
if it satisfies all or most of the following criteria: (1) a history of
discrimination and stigma or opprobrium; (2) the presence of
incorrect stereotypes perpetuated by the impugned law; (3) the
immutability of the defining trait of the group; and (4) the fact
that the group is a discrete and insular minority.116 Heightened
scrutiny of legislation where suspect classes are involved is well-
established in the United States and has been accepted by the
Malaysian Supreme Court in Malaysian Bar v Government of
Malaysia117 and Government of Malaysia v VR Menon.118 If
115
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117
[1952] AIR SC 196 at 200.
See generally, Note, “Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of Discriminatory
Intent: A New Model” (1981) 90 Yale LJ 912 at 917-19; Harris M Miller II,
“An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny
to Classifications Based on Homosexuality” (1984) 57 S Cal LR 797 at
809-16; Note, “The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexu-
ality as a Suspect Classification” (1985) 98 Harv L Rev 1285 at 1299-1305.
[1987] 2 MLJ 165.
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heightened scrutiny is applicable, derogation from the individual’s
personal liberty cannot simply have a rational nexus with the
law’s goal. The derogation must be “necessary to the accom-
plishment”119 of a “compelling state interest”.120 While absolute
necessity is not required, the court will require a close relation-
ship or “tight fit” between the derogation and promotion of the
compelling governmental objective of the statute.121 Heightened
scrutiny ensures that the fundamental liberties of vulnerable mem-
bers of society are not impinged upon.
Some criticise moderate textualism for leaving too much space
to manoeuvre in. There is a valid fear that substantive natural
justice may become a way for judges to enter the political arena
and invalidate laws on the basis of their own subjective opinions
and agendas. But constitutional interpretation is not a mathemat-
ical formula. Judges are human beings, and necessarily bring
to constitutional interpretation their knowledge, experiences and
feelings. Indeed, we are enriched by the insights given by judges
into difficult issues facing society, appointed as they are for their
wisdom, experience and discernment. As the VG Row case points
out:122
In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own con-
ception of what is reasonable in all the circumstances of a given
case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of
values of the Judges participating in the decision should play
an important part, and the limit to their interference with legis-
lative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense
of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection
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Cf McLaughlin v Florida (1964) 379 US 184 at 192.
Cf Plyler v Doe (1982) 457 US 202 at 217.
Cf Nowak & Rotunda, supra, n 84 at 575 § 14.3.
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that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way
of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the educated
representatives of the people have, in authorising the imposition
of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.
To ensure that our judges possess this “sense of responsibility and
self-restraint”, Art 95 of the Constitution lays a heavy burden on
the President, Prime Minister and Chief Justice. The appointment
process is one of the most significant safeguards against a runaway
judiciary. By choosing objective and impartial people as judges,
Singapore can avoid unleashing a tide of rampant activism.
In any case, there is no reason to suppose that if Singapore
judges began examining legislation substantively under Art 9(1)
they would exercise their power in an uncontrolled manner. In
PP v Mazlan bin Maidun,123 the Court of Criminal Appeal held
that an accused person does not have a constitutional right to
be informed of his privilege against self-incrimination since it is
not a fundamental rule of natural justice under Art 9(1). “To say
that the right of silence is a constitutional right would be to
elevate an evidential rule to constitutional status despite its having
been given no explicit expression in the Constitution. Such an
elevation requires in the interpretation of Art 9(1) a degree of
adventurous extrapolation which we do not consider justified.”124
This approach is excessively cautious, but it shows that our judges
are not likely to embark on a frolic of invalidating legislation
without very good reasons.
Applying moderate textualism, how should Loh Wai Kong
have been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Malaysia? It is
submitted that the court should have recognised a right to freedom
of movement as an aspect of personal liberty in Art 9(1), but
123
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found that it was reasonable for this right to be restricted by
law in this case. The defendant had criminal charges pending
against him, so it was eminently rational for the government to
prevent him from fleeing the jurisdiction by refusing to issue him
a passport.125
IV. CONCLUSION
1995 marks the 30th anniversary of the fundamental liberties’
existence in our Constitution. But today a large stumbling block
lies in the way of a broader interpretation of the fundamental
liberties in our Constitution: individual rights have never been
more unpopular. This is due in large part to the government’s
reluctance to promote them for fear of overwhelming societal
interests. In the recent White Paper entitled Shared Values,126 the
government stated:
A major difference between Asian and Western values is the
balance each strikes between the individual and the community.
The difference is not so stark as black and white, but one of
degree. On the whole, Asian societies emphasise the interests
125 Loh Wai Kong, although technically not binding on Singapore courts, is
nevertheless extremely persuasive because Malaysia’s Art 5(1) and our
Art 9(1) are identical. Chen Hsin Hsiong v Guardian Royal Exchange
Assurance [1994] 2 SLR 92 at 98E, suggests that s 9A(1) of the Interpreta-
tion Act is not to be used to depart from what would otherwise have been
regarded as binding authority: “Section 9A(1) was enacted to assist in the
interpretation of statutes; it was not enacted to change the law as it existed
at the date that provision was passed.” It is submitted that this cannot be
right. If examination of the purpose or object of a statute reveals that it
has been inaccurately construed in the past, surely the court should depart
from its previous decision either under the per incuriam principle or, in
the case of the Court of Appeal, under its inherent power to overrule itself.
Cmd 1 of 1991, at 5 paras 24, 26. For an interesting criticism of the White
Paper, see Yash Ghai, “Asian Perspectives on Human Rights” (1993) 23
HKLJ 342.
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of the community, while Western societies stress the rights of
the individual. . . . Singapore is an Asian society. It has always
weighted group interests more heavily than individual ones.
Emphasizing the group over the individual is not in itself objec-
tionable. It merely means that Singapore has chosen to strike
a different balance. But there is supposed to be a balance of
interests, not the suppression of one in favour of the other. The
Canadian case R v Morgentaler127 reminds us that “[a]n indi-
vidual is not a totally independent entity disconnected from the
society in which he or she lives. Neither, however, is the individual
a mere cog in an impersonal machine in which his or her values,
goals and aspirations are subordinated to those of the collectivity.
The individual is a bit of both.”
The Constitution strives towards this ideal. It balances the
clamour of the majority against the individual’s small voice.
When executive and legislative power unjustifiably encroaches
on fundamental liberties, it is curtailed by the courts through
judicial review. At the same time, the Constitution limits judicial
competence by allowing executive and legislative action to derogate
from fundamental liberties in specified circumstances. By main-
taining this tension we achieve the Constitution’s objectives. It is,
therefore, crucial that the judiciary not unduly fetter itself through
narrow interpretations of the Constitution. This is illustrated by
Art 9(1). The courts should embrace moderate textualism; they
should interpret “personal liberty” as widely as the words suggest
and rediscover their power to test the substantive content of written
law against this Article.
Asserts the White Paper: “The concept of government by hon-
ourable men . . . who have a duty to do right for the people,
and who have the trust and respect of the population, fits us
better than the Western idea that a government should be given
as limited powers as possible, and should always be treated with
127 [1988] 1 SCR 30 (SC, Canada).
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suspicion unless proven otherwise.”128 Yet the principle of limited
government is what underlies our Constitution. And rightly so,
it is submitted, for the Constitution is designed to work in bad
times as well as good. Government by honourable men and women
should always be our aim. But in times of turmoil our fundamental
liberties might be all that stand between us as individuals and the
tyranny of a future government gone wrong.
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guarantee certain fundamental rights, and it is proposed to accept
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Constitutional Head of State; freedom of religion; freedom of
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and political justice and equality; and equal rights to education.
This document is of tangential interest only. However, it shows
the concerns of a segment of the population towards fundamental
liberties in the Constitution.]
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Malaya Constitutional Commission (11 February 1957) (Chairman:
Lord James Scott Cumberland Reid) ch IX at 70-76 paras 161-76.
Reprinted in Tan, Yeo & Lee, supra, 708 at 742-46 (Appendix A)
with the appendices omitted.
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number J615.5 MLCD; and in the National Library on microfilm
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cols 2939-3030 (11 July 1957)
cols 3091-92 (14 August 1957)
[Debates on the Reid Constitutional Commission report. Most
of the debates centred around equality and equal protection of
the laws with reference to the special position of the Malays; the
210 Singapore Law Review (1995)
right to freedom of religion and Islam as the official religion in
Malaysia; the supremacy clause (Art 4) and the original rule of
law clause dropped from the final draft of the Constitution; and
reasonable restrictions on the fundamental liberties.]
col 3124 (14 August 1957)
cols 3135-79 (15 August 1957)
[The First Reading of the Federal Constitution Bill 1957 was
on 14 August 1957. The Second Reading and debates on the
Bill were held on 15 August 1957. The Bill was then sent into
committee, read a third time, and passed: cols 3178-79.]
Minutes of the Second Legislative Council of the Federation of
Malaya With Council Papers for the Period (Second Session)
November, 1956 to August, 7957(1958), available in the Singapore
and Malaysia Collection of the National University of Singapore
Central Library, call number J615.5 MLCM.
pp A97-A99
pp A105-A106
pp A119
pp A125-A126
[A convenient list of the Members of the Legislative Council
who spoke during the debates on the report of the Reid Constitu-
tional Commission and the Federal Constitution Bill 1957, and
minutes of procedural aspects of the debates.]
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Report of the Constitutional Commission 1966 (27 August 1966)
(Chairman: Wee Chong Jin CJ) ch II at 5-12 paras 20-45. Re-
printed in Tan, Yeo & Lee, supra, 794 at 796-800 (Appendix D).
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cols 1276-1326 (15 March 1967)
cols 1329-86 (16 March 1967)
cols 1389-1440 (17 March 1967)
[Parliamentary debates on the Constitutional Commission 1966.
Most of the debates centred around the right to property, the need
for a Parliamentary ombudsman, and the proposed Council of
State (now the Presidential Council of Minority Rights).
Concerning fundamental liberties, Parliament accepted the
Commission’s recommendations to retain in the Constitution these
fundamental liberties derived from the Malaysian Constitution:
the right to life and personal liberty; prohibition of slavery and
forced labour; retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials;
equality of all persons; prohibitions of banishment and freedom
of movement; freedom of speech, assembly and association; and
freedom of religion.
Parliament also approved the right of the individual not to
be subject to torture; the right to elect a government of one’s
own choice; and the right to apply to court for enforcement of
fundamental rights and liberties. To date these rights have not
been included in the Constitution. Parliament rejected inclusion
of a right to property: see cols 1053-54 and 1440.]
